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ABSTRACT
This paper will describe some current issues and developments that are of relevance to
sound recordings protection, as they are experienced and debated in industry and among
customers, as well as policy making bodies. The paper’s focus is on the historical development
of sound recordings protection under United States Copyright law. In Part II, this paper will
explore early federal and state law protections for sound recordings, including the Copyright Act
of 1909, common law protections, and state statutes.

This section also will trace the

development of proposals for a federal statute granting express copyright protection for sound
recordings.

In Part III, this paper will examine the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment,

particularly the scope of protection afforded for sound recordings. In Part IV, the paper will
review some recent forms of sound recording piracy that occur over the Internet with the
development of digital technologies, recent litigation, and alternative solutions technology can
offer against piracy. Finally, in Part V it will examine the available remedies in federal law
against sound recording piracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The development of copyright law in the United States has been marked by considerable
conceptual diversity. The language of the United States Constitution does not explicitly employ
the word ‘copyright,’ but as adopted in its final form on September 5, 1787, the Copyright
Clause gives Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”1 It was not until 1971, however, that Congress granted limited
copyright protection for sound recordings2 as a response to the growing need to cope with
unauthorized duplication and piracy. Even with limited copyright protection afforded to sound
recordings, sound recording piracy nevertheless continues to be a threat of national and
international dimension to sound record producers’ rights. Courts and prosecutors indeed have
described sound recording piracy as “an electronic age crime,”3 “theft,”4 an “outrage,”5 “a
shabby business that offends a person’s sense of fair play,”6 and a “lucrative means of getting
illicit funds into the underworld.”7

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2

The Sound Recordings Amendment Act adopted by Congress in 1971 granted for the first time federal copyright

protection to sound recordings.
3

RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, STATE LAWS AGAINST PIRACY OF SOUND

RECORDINGS: A HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION (1974) (at Introduction).
4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

1

To understand the problem of sound recording piracy, it is necessary to first describe the
process of creating sound recordings. A sound recording basically consists of the contributions
of authors of the musical and literary work embodied in the record, contributions of performers
(singers, musicians, and actors), and contributions of record producers (directors, sound
engineers, and other personnel involved in capturing, editing, and mixing sound). In general, the
production and distribution of a sound recording involves three stages. The first stage is the
production of the recording itself. The production of a record constitutes the creative stage,
including the selection of works and performers, proper arrangement, studio rehearsals, and
finally, materialization of the recording itself in an appropriate material bearer – a matrix. The
second stage involves the reproduction of the recording from the matrix into records, tapes,
cassettes, compact disks, and other media. The last stage is the placement and sale of the sound
recording in the market.
Piracy essentially is the unauthorized commercial duplication and sale of a reproduction
of a sound recording, usually for a much lower price.8 Pirates generally skip directly to the
second stage of producing a sound recording and concentrate their efforts on the third stage;
because they avoid compensation to the author, performers, and studio team, their profits are
extensive. The practice of off-the-air taping and piracy of sound recordings grew rapidly in the
late 1960s in the United States.9 Technological advances made possible the reproduction of
sound recordings at a cost much lower than that of the originally produced record. The potential
for huge profits made this activity too tempting for some to resist. In order to counteract the
abuses, Congress granted a limited copyright for sound recordings with the passage of the Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971. Nevertheless, due to the constantly improving and now almost
flawless sound recording techniques, sound recording piracy has become even more common.
8

See IFPI’s (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) “Music Piracy Report 2002” at

http://www.ifpi.org. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 937 (7th ed. 1999).
9

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, (1971).

2

Digital technology today enables the use and transmission of copyright protected materials in
digital form over interactive networks. The process of ‘digitization ‘ allows the conversion of
such materials into binary form, which can be transmitted across the Internet, and then redistributed, copied and stored in perfect digital form at the touch of a button. As a result, the
potential for damage to authors, performers, record producers, and many other individuals
involved in the creative process is unquestionable.
Many of the questions related to sound recording piracy today are still unsettled and are
likely to remain so for the next few years. Rather than attempting to predict what the future will
hold, or prescribe what it should look like, this paper will describe some current issues and
developments that are of relevance to sound recordings protection, as they are experienced and
debated in industry and among customers, as well as policy making bodies. The paper’s focus is
on the historical perspective of sound recordings protection under United States Copyright law.
For this reason, in Part II, this paper will explore early federal and state law protections for sound
recordings, including the Copyright Act of 1909, common law protections, and state statutes.
This section also will trace the development of proposals for a federal statute granting express
copyright protection for sound recordings. In Part III, this paper will examine the 1971 Sound
Recording Amendment, particularly the scope of protection afforded for sound recordings. In
Part IV, the paper will review some recent forms of sound recording piracy that occur over the
Internet with the development of digital technologies, recent litigation, and alternative solutions
technology can offer against piracy. Finally, in Part V it will examine the available remedies in
federal law against sound recording piracy.

3

II. SOUND RECORDINGS PROTECTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Before reviewing the first federal act to provide copyright protection for sound
recordings, this paper will trace the historical development of sound recordings protection in the
United States.

A. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co.

A very important U.S. Supreme Court case, which had a major impact on the Copyright
Act of 1909, is White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co.10 Decided in 1908, just one year
prior to the passage of the Act, the case involved infringement of the copyrights of two musical
compositions. The defendant, Apollo Company, was engaged in the sale of player pianos and
accompanying perforated rolls of music.11

The plaintiff, White-Smith Music Publishing

Company, held the copyrights on two musical compositions embodied in the defendant’s piano
rolls.12

The plaintiff argued that copyright protection should be available “to prevent the

multiplication of every means of reproducing the music of the composer to the ear.”13 The
Supreme Court held for the defendant, stating that the perforated piano roll, which represented a
sound recording, was not a “copy” within the meaning of the copyright act;14 composers thereby
had no right to control such recordings of their works under existing law.

10

209 U.S. 1 (1908).

11

Id. at 8-9.

12

Id. at 9.

13

Id. at 11.

14

Id. at 17-18.

4

B. The 1909 Copyright Act

As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in White-Smith Music, the Copyright Act
of 1909 did not include sound recordings in the list of various works for which copyright
registration could be obtained.15 Indeed, no provision in the statute specifically dealt with sound
recordings. The Copyright Act of 1909 instead allowed a record pirate to avoid liability to a
composer or producer by paying mechanical royalties.16 Even if a composer or a producer
brought a copyright infringement suit based on illegal infringement of the music by a pirate who
had not paid the mechanical royalties, if the pirate had filed a “notice of use”

17

, the damages

recoverable could well be limited to those royalties.18
Section 1(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act moreover provided:

Any person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right . . . [t]o perform the
copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the
purpose of public performance for profit, and for the purposes [to print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work], to make any arrangement or
setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record
in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read
or reproduced: Provided, That the provisions of this title, so far as they secure
copyright controlling the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically

15

Copyright Act of 1909, § 5, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1977) (repealed January 1, 1978).

16

Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).

17

Id.

18

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, (1971) (“No Federal remedy currently available to combat . . . unauthorized

reproduction . . . .”).

5

the musical work, shall include only compositions published and copyrighted
after July 1, 1909 . . . .19

At the same time, fearful of creating a monopoly within the recording industry, Congress
added a compulsory licensing provision that stated:

[A]s a condition of extending the copyrighted control to such mechanical
reproductions, that whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or
permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the
parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any
other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to
the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to
be paid by the manufacturer thereof . . . .20

A composer thus had the right to select the licensee who would originally produce a
record of the musical work, but thereafter, any other manufacturer also could record the
composition upon the payment of the two-cent fee to the copyright proprietor, pursuant to the
compulsory licensing provision. The provision thereby benefited the composer of the musical
work, but not the record producer.
Finally, section 101(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act provided in part:

Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted the use of the
copyrighted work upon the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce
mechanically the musical work, then in case of infringement of such copyright by
19

Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e) (emphasis added).

20

Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).

6

the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of interchangeable parts . . . no
criminal action shall be brought, but in a civil action an injunction may be granted
upon such terms as the court may impose, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to
recover in lieu of profits and damages a royalty as provided in section 1,
subsection (e), of this title.21

In sum, four major characteristics describe the state of federal copyright law with respect
to mechanical reproductions of recordings from 1909 until the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971. First, a composer or publisher was entitled to a composition copyright that included
protection against mechanical reproductions of the musical work.22 Secondly, no copyright
existed with respect to the mechanical reproductions themselves, for example, records, piano
rolls, and tapes; only the compositions embodied in the mechanical reproductions were
protected.23

Thirdly, once an owner of a composition copyright allowed any person to

mechanically reproduce the musical work, any other person could make a “similar use” of the
composition upon the payment of two cents to the composition copyright holder.24 Fourthly, no
criminal action would lie with respect to infringement of a composition copyright by
unauthorized mechanical reproduction.25
Some authors contend that even prior to the enactment of the Sound Recordings
Amendment of 1971, sound recordings arguably were “writings” within the meaning of section 4

21

Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081. (This is the original text of the provision at the time of

passage of the act. It was later amended in 1947, 1948 and 1971).
22

Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081. See supra note 21.
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of the 1909 Copyright Act and hence could be copyrighted.26 However, except for one early and
startling exception,27 the courts applying the 1909 Copyright Act uniformly assumed that sound
recordings could not be copyrighted. The United States Copyright Office also adopted this view
and consistently refused to accept sound recordings for copyright registration.28
From 1909 to 1955, no court directly decided whether sound recordings could be
copyrighted. Then, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.,29 Judge Dimock stated
that both before and after the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress “intended that one who performed a
public-domain musical composition should not be able to obtain copyright protection for a
phonographic record thereof . . . .”30 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Learned Hand agreed that
sound recordings could not have been copyrighted under the 1909 Copyright Act.31 On the other
hand, Judge Hand argued that sound recordings were “writings” within the United States
Constitution. He explained, “Now that it has become possible to capture these contributions of
the individual performer upon a physical object that can be made to reproduce them, there should
be no doubt that this is within the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.”32

26

See Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COL. L. REV. 719, 734 (1945).

27

Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), overruled by Ricordi v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.

1952). The court in Fonotipia clearly stated, “[S]ince the 1st day of July, 1909, any form of recording or
transcribing [of] a musical composition, or rendition of such composition, has been capable of registration, and the
property rights therein secured under the copyright statute.” Id. at 963.
28

See Barbara A. Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 117-

168 (Arthur Fisher, ed., 1963).
29

221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).

30

Id. at 661.

31

Id. at 664.

32

Id. Thus, according to the dissent in Capitol Records, recorded performances enjoyed copyright protection under

the U.S. Constitution even though federal copyright legislation afforded no such protection.

8

C. Common Law Protection Against Duplication

Performers and record producers were given no copyright protection for their sound
recordings under the federal copyright statute, therefore they turned to various state laws for
recognition of their rights. The judge-made law differed from state to state and sometimes was
contradictory. However, two major legal theories served as the basis for state law protection
afforded to record producers: (i) the common law copyright and (ii) the theory of unfair
competition. The common law copyright provided complete protection against unauthorized use
to any unpublished work that represented an original intellectual creation or artistic contribution.
The theory of unfair competition provided protection against unfair use of a work in business.
The work did not have to be original or creative in order to be protected, but it must have
required some expenditure or investment of money, skill, time, and effort.33 Moreover, state law
permitted simultaneous claims for infringement of rights based on both grounds – unfair
competition and common law copyright.34

1. Common Law Copyright

The common law protection of sound recordings remains essential as a protection for
sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. Section 301(c) of the Sound Recordings
Amendment of 1971 provided: “[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15,
1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled
or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. “35

33

Ringer supra note 28 at 130-132.

34

Id.

35

17 U.S.C. § 301(c)

9

A prerequisite of the common law protection is the requirement that the work should not
be published. Upon publication, the work is considered to enter the public domain, and the
common law protection is no longer available. The determination of when a sound recording has
been published thus is pivotal to the grant of protection. A court must determine whether the
unrestricted sale or public distribution of a sound recording represents a publication, and if so,
whether a sound recording that lacks federal statutory protection enters into the public domain
upon such publication.
In RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,36 the plaintiff record company sued the defendant radio
broadcasting company for copyright infringement arising from the unlicensed broadcast of
phonograph records of musical performances by a musician with whom the plaintiff had an
exclusive contract. In a decision written by Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit held that
the public sale of the phonograph records terminated the common law copyright; use of the
records thereby could not be restricted.37 The case was decided in 1940, and subsequently was
adopted as controlling law in New York and several other jurisdictions.38
In 1950, a New York trial court nevertheless reached a contrary decision in Metro. Opera
Ass’n. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.39 The plaintiffs were an opera company, a recording
company with a license from the opera company, and a broadcasting company, which brought an
action against the defendants to restrain the commercial sale of unauthorized records reproduced
from the opera broadcasts. Although the court primarily based its decision on the theory of

36

114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). (Even though the case does not involve copying, it

is cited to illustrate a finding that the public sale of a recording is equal to publication).
37

Id. at 88-89.

38

Previously, other decisions upholding the unpublished work requirement included Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F.Supp.

338 (E.D.N.C. 1939), and Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937). See also, e.g., Comment,
Recent Developments in Performers’ Literary Property Law, 1953 U.C.L.A. INTRA. L. REV. 13 (1953).
39

101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950).

10

unfair competition, it also concluded that the opera performances were protected by the common
law copyright, which had not been destroyed by the performance or broadcast.40
In Capitol Records, which involved unauthorized dubbing,41 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed an injunction of the District Court against the defendant, prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of records for which the plaintiff had an exclusive assignment. The court
found that the plaintiff had not abrogated its rights by offering the records for public sale. It
refused to apply the rule in RCA Mfg., whereby “the commonlaw [sic] property in the
performances of musical artists which had been recorded ended with the sale of the records and
that thereafter anyone might copy them and use them as he pleased.”42 Instead, the Second
Circuit decided the case on the basis of Metro. Opera, clearly stating, “[T]he inescapable result
of [Metro. Opera] is that, where the originator, or the assignee of the originator, of records of
performances by musical artists puts those records on public sale, his act does not constitute a
dedication of the right to copy and sell the records.”43 In Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc.,44 a
New York trial court cited Capital Records and affirmed, “The originator or his assignee of
records of performances of an artist does not, by putting such records on public sale, dedicate the
right to copy or sell the record.”45
Another issue that arises in the context of the common law copyright is the protection of
the actual sound recording. The protection available to a recorded performance as an original

40

Id. at 493-95.

41

“Dubbing” is a technical term that represents all means by which specific sounds contained in one record can be

reproduced on another record – repressing, electrical transcription, recapturing, or any other method of duplication.
See Ringer supra note 28 at 119.
42

Capital Records, 221 F.2d at 663.

43

Id.

44

155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1956).

45

Id. at 172-73.
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intellectual creation is well established.46 On the other hand, the courts rarely have examined
whether the contribution of a sound recording producer is sufficiently creative to secure common
law copyright protection. Some authors even doubt that a sound record producer could secure
common law protection for his sound recordings.47
The issue was considered by the District Court in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman.48 Judge
Leibell stated, “One of the most controverted issues was whether or not the part played by RCA
Victor Company in the recording of Whiteman’s interpretation and renditions constituted such
intellectual and artistic contributions as to vest in RCA a common law property right in what
went on the record. I am of the opinion that it did not.”49
The judge continued:

46

In RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F.Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), rev’d on other grounds 114 F. 2d 86 (2d

Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940), Judge Leibell stated that, even before the invention of the phonograph,
a performer had a common law copyright in his rendition; he asserted that “during all this time the right was always
present, yet because of the impossibility of violating it, it was not necessary to assert it.” The following cases may
also be cited in support of this proposition, even though some of them do not involve rights in sound recordings of
performances, but deal with analogous situations: National Ass’n of Performing Artists v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting
Co., 38. F. Supp. 531 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Noble v. One Sixty Commonwealth Avenue, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mass.
1937); Long v. Decca Records, Inc., 76 N. Y. S. 2d 133 (Supp. Ct. 1947); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corporation, 109 F. Supp. 330 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), aff’d 221 F. 2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); Autry v. Republic
Productions, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 918 (S. D. Cal. 1952), aff’d and modified 213 FR. 2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954); Giesking v.
Urania records, Inc., 155 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (Supp. Ct. 1956).
47

Baum, Protection of Records, Protection of Artists and Copyright, 5 GEITIGES EIGENTUM 1 (1939). See also

Hirsch Ballin, Related Rights, 18 ARCHIV FUR FILM, FUNK AND THEATERRECHT 310 (Copyright Society
Translation Service 1955, no. 4a) (1954).
48

28 F.Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).

49

Id. at 792.

12

None of the efforts of RCA were directed towards perfecting Whiteman’s artistic
interpretation of the musical composition, but all were directed towards
‘capturing’ completely for the matrix or master record his unique interpretations.
The well known manufacturers of phonograph records use the same apparatus and
methods. The average person could not tell by listening to the finished record
which company made the record or which musical director supervised its
recording or who manipulated the dials, arranged the microphones or handled the
other mechanical devices used in getting the physical recording. But many of the
public can recognize Whiteman’s peculiar interpretation of certain popular
musical recordings.50

Judge Leibell’s decision was later reversed on appeal upon other grounds,51 but its
conclusion on this point found inferential support in later cases.52
Under the common law copyright, ownership of the rights for a sound recording usually
is governed by the terms of the particular contract. A performer may grant all of his rights to a
record producer or retain certain rights for himself. Where a contract fails to specify the
allocation of rights, however, the courts have split. Some courts have held that all rights are

50

Id.

51

RCA Mfg., 114 F.2d 86 (1940). In the decision on appeal, Judge Learned Hand recognized that sound record

producers had certain skills and art which were necessary to the production of a proper recording. Id. at 88.
52

See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corporation, 109 F. Supp. 330 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), aff’d 221 F. 2d

657 (2d Cir. 1955). Both the trial and appellate courts were of the opinion that a sound record producer acquired a
copyright through an assignment from the performers.

13

transferred to the producer of the sound recording, while other courts have granted the performer
the right to enjoin particular unintended uses of the performance.53

2. Theory of Unfair Competition

The other main basis for common law protection of sound recordings is the theory of
unfair competition. An unfair competition claim arises when a company misrepresents its
services, goods, or the company itself. The plaintiff and defendant often are competitors because
unfair competition claims usually involve use of deceptively similar company and product
names, confusion as to the source of goods, false advertising, or other misrepresentations.54 In
the case of an unauthorized duplication of sound recordings, certain elements of the unfair
competition claim may be difficult to establish and even non-existent. As a result, courts
frequently have broadened the concept of unfair competition when applied to the unauthorized
duplication of sound recordings.
An example of the broadened theory of unfair competition is the opinion of the court in
Metro. Opera. The court granted relief to the plaintiffs opera company, broadcaster, and record
company, against the producer of unauthorized records.

According to the majority, direct

competition and misrepresentation were not required to establish a finding of unfair competition.
The court stated:

The early cases of unfair competition in which relief was granted were
cases involving ‘palming off’ – that is, the fraudulent representation of the goods
of the seller as those of another. The early decisions condemning this practice
were based on the two wrongs inflicted thereby: (1) The deceit and fraud on the
53

See Ringer supra note 28 at 131-132.

54

Id. at 129

14

public; and (2) the misappropriation to one person of the benefit of a name,
reputation or business good will belonging to another.
With the passage of those simple and halcyon days when the chief
business malpractice was ‘palming off’ and with the development of more
complex business relationships and, unfortunately, malpractices, many courts,
including the courts of this state, extended the doctrine of unfair competition
beyond the cases of ‘palming off.’ The extension resulted in the granting of relief
in cases where there was no fraud on the public, but only a misappropriation for
the commercial advantage of one person of a benefit or ‘property right’ belonging
to another.
The courts have used various formulae in making this extension. Many of
the earlier of such decisions relied on the presence of special elements: For
example, inducing breach of trust or breach of contract in misappropriating the
property.55

Some commentators and judges have criticized the broad interpretation of unfair
competition,56 but the majority of courts presently do not strictly require the fulfillment of all the
elements of unfair competition – especially “palming off” and direct competition – and would
make a finding of unfair competition simply on the basis of misappropriation or a “free ride.”57

55

Metro. Opera, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

56

Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1319-1320 (1940). See also the opinion in RCA Mfg., 114

F.2d 86, written by Judge Learned Hand, who has consistently warned on the danger of attempting to protect
something under unfair competition that cannot be protected under common law or statutory copyright and thus
doing violence to the constitutional purpose and the congressional intent.
57

For a detailed discussion of the various unfair competition interpretations by courts in copyright infringement

cases, see Ringer, supra note 28, at 135-138.
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In sum, while the common law copyright does not clearly authorize the same protection for
sound recordings as for recorded performances, the theory of unfair competition grants
protection to both performers and record producers against duplication of sound recordings.

D. State Statutes Criminalizing Sound Recording Piracy

Sound recordings made and released prior to February 15, 1972, also are protected under
criminal anti-piracy statutes adopted by almost all states.58 In Goldstein v. California,59 the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a California statute which criminalized record and tape
piracy, and held that the existence of a federal copyright act did not preempt state protection of
sound recordings.60 Essentially, the states did not relinquish all control of copyright matters to
the federal government, and uniformity was not required for successful implementation of
copyright laws.61 The decision thereby upheld the right of each state to criminalize and regulate
the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings within its jurisdiction, when such recordings
were not protected by federal law.
The court explained:

[T]he federal copyright statutes to which petitioners refer were amended by
Congress while their case was pending in the state courts. In 1971, Pub.L. 92140, 85 Stat. 391, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e), was passed to allow
federal copyright protection of recordings. However, § 3 of the amendment
specifically provides that such protection is to be available only to sound
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recordings ‘fixed, published, and copyrighted’ on and after February 15, 1972,
and before January 1, 1975, and that nothing in Title 17, as amended is to ‘be
applied retroactively or (to) be construed as affecting in any way any rights with
respect to sound recordings fixed before’ February 15, 1972. The recordings
which petitioners copied were all ‘fixed’ prior to February 15, 1972. Since,
according to the language of § [3] of the amendment, Congress did not intend to
alter the legal relationships which govern these recordings, the amendments have
no application in petitioners’ case.62

In states that had not enacted criminal anti-piracy laws, a legitimate recording company
may bring a civil action against pirates in state courts for unfair competition. Civil remedies
rarely have been adequate, however, primarily because they are very time-consuming. It may
take months for a plaintiff to successfully obtain an injunction.63 Moreover, although a pirate
may be enjoined from duplicating the works of that particular plaintiff, he remains free to
illegally duplicate sound recordings produced by other recording companies.
Depending on the state, criminal anti-piracy statutes categorize the unauthorized
duplication of legitimate sound recordings as a misdemeanor or felony. Under the statutes, it is
unlawful to knowingly manufacture, distribute, or retail a recording which contains sounds that
have been transferred without the owner’s consent.64 Some state statutes also criminalize the
sale or distribution of recordings that do not bear the name and address of the transferor of
sounds. The penalties imposed are fines or imprisonment. The statutes of Georgia, Minnesota,
Tennessee, and Pennsylvania provide particularly harsh penalties. For example, section 3 of the
Georgia Code provides:
62

Id. at 552.
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Violation of this Code section is a felony and is punishable upon conviction by a
fine of not more than $25,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than two years, or both fine and imprisonment; second or subsequent
violations of this Code section shall be punishable upon conviction by a fine of
not more than $100,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one year nor
more than three years, or both fine and imprisonment.65

In order to sustain a charge of sound recording piracy under the state statutes, a plaintiff
must show an offer for sale or purchase of a pirated product. Most state laws further provide that
it is “unlawful knowingly to manufacture, distribute or retail a recording whose sounds are
transferred without the owner’s consent.”66 Courts generally have required the distributor,
retailer, or their agents to admit the illegitimate nature of the sound recording piracy. In the case
where such an admission cannot be secured, the court or the plaintiff may notify the distributor
or retailer of the illegal nature of their activity by mail. If the distributor or retailer continues to
sell or distribute the pirated material after receipt of the notice, prior knowledge is presumed and
they can be convicted.67 State statutes criminalizing sound recording piracy continue to provide
protection for sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, for which no federal statutory
protection is available.
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E. Congressional Proposals Prior to 1971

The first bill to propose a copyright for sound recordings was introduced in Congress on
January 2, 1925.68 The Perkins Bill provided protection for “phonographic records, perforated
rolls and other contrivances by means of which sounds may be mechanically reproduced.”69
Under the Bill, the rights of a sound recording producer were conditioned on the rights of the
author of the underlying work. The Bill thus recognized that a record manufacturer was entitled
to a copyright for the recording; however, if a subsisting copyright existed on the underlying
work, the manufacturer could only record, copy, and sell the record during the term of the
subsisting copyright.70 The term of a copyright on a sound recording generally lasted for fifty
years following the date of public distribution, offer for sale, or first sale.71
Nevertheless, the Perkins Bill encountered substantial opposition.

Manufacturers

observed that the Bill merely provided protection against dubbing, which already was covered by
the common law theory of unfair competition.

Author-publisher groups argued that the

compulsory licensing provisions more greatly benefited performers; under the provisions,
authors received a fixed compensation of two cents per record, while performers enjoyed
unlimited bargaining power.72 The Perkins Bill consequently proved unsuccessful.
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The Vestal Bill,73 introduced in 1926, represented the next federal legislative proposal.
The Bill utilized the same provisions as the Perkins Bill; however, it did not specify the duration
of the rights provided for the sound recording producer.74 The Vestal Bill further granted
protection against any unauthorized broadcast or public performance of the sound recording.75
Although the Bill re-introduced heated debate concerning the unequal bargaining powers given
to authors and performers in the compulsory licensing provisions,76 the grant of a copyright for
sound recordings generally was uncontroversial.
Nevertheless, both the 69th and 70th Congresses failed to pass the Vestal Bill, and
hearings on various versions of the Bill continued in 1928, 1929, and 1930. The version
introduced in 1930 substantially changed the provision listing the classes of works that could be
copyrighted. The revised provision provided protection only for recordings that had not been
prepared for “public performance, exhibition or transmission”;77 it thereby excluded protection
for sound recordings prepared for broadcast or soundtracks.
The 1930 version of the Vestal Bill further stated:

Phonographic records, perforated rolls, and other similar contrivances, by means
of which sounds may be mechanically recorded for purposes other than public
performance, exhibition, or transmission: Provided, Anything to the contrary of
this Act, notwithstanding, that the copyright in such phonographic records, rolls,
or contrivances shall consist solely of the exclusive right to print, reprint, publish,

73
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copy, and vend said phonographic records, rolls and contrivances, and that any
such copyright and each and every right thereunder, shall be subject to each and
every right of the owner of the copyright in any existing or previously existing
work, written on said records, rolls, or other contrivances, at all times, in the
absence of express contract to the contrary.78

The 1930 Vestal Bill thus further limited copyright protection for sound recordings by restricting
protection to the making, copying, and sale of a sound recording. It also conditioned the rights
of the record producer on the rights of the owner of the copyright in the underlying work.
During the debates in the House of Representatives, however, Representative Busby
removed the provision;79 sound recordings thereby were excluded from the list of works that
could be copyrighted. Moreover, upon the proposal of Representative Stafford, the provision
covering “works not specifically hereinabove enumerated” also was stricken.80 The Senate
indeed did not even discuss whether sound recordings could be copyrighted. There had been
comments that the elimination of a copyright protection for sound recordings occurred due to
concern that the provision was unconstitutional.81

A representative of the sound record

producers, Frank D. Scott, made a final attempt to secure copyright protection for sound
recordings;82 however, the proposal received no further discussion in the Senate.
As use of sound recordings in radio broadcastings increased in the 1930s, however,
record manufacturers urged the legislature to provide a copyright for sound recordings. Many
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other countries indeed already had afforded copyright protection to sound recordings.83
Representative Sirovich, who was also a chairman of the Committee on Patents, subsequently
introduced a bill to provide copyright protection for sound recordings in March 1932.84 The
National Broadcaster’s Association initially opposed the Sirovich Bill, arguing that a grant of
copyright protection to sound recordings severely disadvantaged small broadcasting stations.85
Nevertheless, during the course of the hearings, the broadcasters indicated that they would accept
the Bill if the provisions were confined to dubbing, thereby excluding broadcasters from its
effect.86
Section 4 of the Sirovich Bill provided:

Translations and compilations, abridgements, adaptations, and arrangements,
including sound disk records and perforated rolls, and arrangements and
compilations for radio broadcasting and television or other versions of work, shall
be regarded as new works and copyright shall subsist therein, notwithstanding
such works are based in whole or in part upon works in the public domain and/or
copyright works provided the consent of the copyright owner has been secured.87

After opponents attacked the provision as unconstitutional,88 Representative Sirovich
revised the Bill to provide that copyright was to subsist in records as “new works,” to the extent
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that the records were original.89 Opponents continued to object to the unconstitutionality of the
Bill, however, contending that, as mechanical devices, records could not be copyrighted.90 Thus,
despite several later amendments, the Sirovich Bill ultimately failed to pass.
Following a three-year hiatus during which attempts to initiate legislative protection for
sound recordings generally had subsided, the Daly Bill,91 a comprehensive bill which granted a
copyright for performances and sound recordings, was introduced in 1936. Under the Bill,
works that could be copyrighted included:

The interpretations, renditions, readings, and performances of any work, when
mechanically reproduced by phonograph records, disks, sound-track tapes, or any
and all other substances and means, containing thereon or conveying a
reproduction of such interpretations, renditions, readings, and performances.92

A month later, Representative Sirovich introduced a revised version of his bill. Both the
Daly and revised Sirovich Bills generated a substantial amount of debate. Performers insisted on
a copyright for their performances on the basis that they were intellectual creators who could
only obtain adequate protection through copyright.93 In contrast, record manufacturers asserted
that the recording represented the artistic creation; thus, the copyright should be granted to the
recording, particularly since other countries already had granted such protection.94 According to
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sound record producers, the rights of performers could best be secured through contracts.
Opponents of the copyright in sound recordings, such as the Music Publishers Association,
jukebox manufacturers, broadcasting organizations, and motion picture producers, argued that
the copyright was unconstitutional on the basis that performances are intangible and thereby
could not be considered writings.95 Finally, authors feared that establishing a new right in sound
recordings would infringe on their rights.96
According to the American Bar Association Committee on Copyrights, the Daly and
revised Sirovich Bills were unacceptable because of excessively loose language.97 Even so, the
Committee on Copyrights recognized that a copyright in recorded performances, which had been
proposed by the Bills, was worthy of further consideration.98 A 1939 Report of the same
committee further stated:

Your committee is of the opinion that whether recorded upon a visual track for
communication through the sense of sight, or recorded upon a sound track for
communication through the sense of hearing, independently or in synchronization,
originality of authorship may be thus expressed in a fixed, permanent, tangible,
identifiable form, capable of being reader communicated intelligibly to others.
Such recordations are a species of “writing” within the Constitutional limitation,
whether the labors of human intelligence so captured or expressed consist of the
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ordinary literary, dramatic or musical concepts, or of the rendition or performing
interpretation through which they may be conveyed.99

The next step in the development of legislative initiatives to introduce a copyright for
sound recordings was H. R. 5791100, named “A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934.”
The purpose of the amendment was to deal with the unauthorized mechanical reproduction of
music and other wire-and-radio program materials, primarily by imposing penalties for
violations. The bill specifically exempted copyright protection for “recordings for private,
personal, civic, or political use,” as well as any “recordings on subjects of public nature.”101
Unfortunately, no further actions were taken on this measure.
Then, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, groups with differing interests in a copyright for
sound recordings approached the Committee for the Study of Copyright (formed under the
patronage of the National Committee of the United States of America on International
Intellectual Cooperation), urging the Committee to encourage better international copyright
relations.102

Record manufacturers insisted that the right should vest entirely in the

manufacturer, in accordance with the practice in the motion picture industry. Performers argued
that they should hold the copyright due to the artistic and intellectual nature of their
performances. Authors asserted that sound recordings were not writings and that the common
law protection should be sufficient. The authors also contended that the exemption of record
producers from the compulsory licensing provisions was unfair, prejudicial, and complicating
due to the multiplicity of licensing. Because broadcasting companies would suffer extensive
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losses if sound recordings were granted a copyright, their economic self-interest dictated
opposition to the legislative initiatives.

Finally, distributors and motion picture producers

promoted a limited copyright for sound recordings, which would only prohibit exact
reproduction of a recording but offer no protection against imitation.103
After RCA Mfg., in which the Second Circuit held that public sales of phonograph records
terminated the common law copyright in the performance and thereby permitted unrestricted use
of the records,104 performers strongly lobbied for legislation to establish effective protection of
their rights. In 1947, Representative Scott introduced a bill that would grant copyright protection
for performances.105 Performers were the only supporters of the Scott Bill. Sound record
producers argued that the copyright should be granted to them; they further contended that the
constitutionality of such a copyright could be easily satisfied because of the creative nature of
their recordings.106 Authors, publishers, and broadcasters opposed the Bill for the same reasons
they had opposed previous proposals for copyright protection. In addition, the U.S. Copyright
Office emphasized technical deficiencies, which further impeded passage of the Bill.107 The
failure of the Scott Bill initiated a long hiatus in the legislative proposals to provide copyright
protection for sound recordings.108

103

See Id. at 151-152.

104

RCA Mfg., 114 F.2d at 88-89.

105

H.R. 1270, 80th Cong. (1st Sess. 1947).

106

See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade Marks, and Copyrights of the House Committee on the

Judiciary on H.R. 1269, H.R. 1270, and H. R. 2570, 80th Cong, (1947).
107

Id. at 263-266.

108

In the 1950s/1960s there were not much initiative and legislative proposals on federal level but that is the time

state criminal anti piracy statutes were adopted in many states to fight sound recording piracy. See supra II.D.

26

III. THE 1971 SOUND RECORDING AMENDMENT

A. The Need for Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings

As a result of the staggering volume of record and tape piracy, Congress passed the first
federal statutory copyright protection for sound recordings in 1971.109 Technological advances
had made possible the reproduction of sound recordings at a cost substantially lower than the
original cost of creating the recording. Thus, the potential for sizeable profits encouraged
numerous abuses of the sound recording process by pirates. By the late 1960s, the volume of
illegal sales in the field had reached alarming scales.110
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See supra note 2.
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In 1970, a Wall Street Journal article described the piracy activity as follows:

The pirates make illegal copies of tapes and peddle them cheaply to record
shops, unabashedly admitting that they are pirated copies. The counterfeiters
make illegal copies but then go a step further and copy the packaging that the
original comes in, too; the counterfeiters then palm off their work as the original.
....
No one really expects the industry to be really killed by the pirates, but
neither does anyone expect the pirates to be knocked off by the industry.
Alarmed record companies have filed more than 100 lawsuits against pirates and
counterfeiters in recent weeks, but “no sooner do we win one suit than another
three counterfeit operations spring up,” says a lawyer for one recording
company.111

The ‘mom and pop’ thieves are a minor annoyance. More worrisome are the large, wellfinanced tape pirates who merchandise and promote their wares with skill and aplomb and are
sometimes backed by organized crime. In addition to turning out hundreds of thousands of tapes
in small factories, many bootleggers install display racks in stores, service stations and other
outlets and contract to keep them filled. They also print catalogues and send salesmen on the road
. . . and sign their sales letters: “Your friendly bootlegger.”
Id.
The article further described the ignorance and naiveté of some merchants, who failed to recognize bootleg
copies even though they were offered extremely low prices, forced to pay in cash, offered a product of a very poor
quality, and interacted with a seller who had no listed address or phone number. Id.
111
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According to Representative Fulton, who spoke in support of new legislation before the
Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives in June 1971, the estimated losses
for the recording industry totaled more than $100 million a year,112 and only one out of ten music
recordings made any profit.113 Due to the low investment required to produce an unauthorized
sound recording duplication, as well as the potential for extensive profits, experts further
believed that the pirate activity would continue unless effective legal measures to combat the
problem were taken. Unless the loss was curtailed, the industry indeed faced an economic
crisis.114 Because state law had failed to keep pace with technical advances, federal copyright
protection that expressly prohibited commercial traffic in unauthorized duplications of legitimate
sound recordings was necessary and appropriate.
Moreover, the unauthorized duplication of legitimate commercial recordings had become
a matter of public concern not only in the United States but also abroad. Pirates duplicated the
recordings of any legitimate record producer; the problem thus affected the international
community, with no differentiation between developed or developing countries. Indeed, various
countries already had made an effort to resolve the piracy problem through an international treaty
to combat record piracy.115 Policy-makers believed that progress in domestic efforts to protect
sound recordings would aid the United States delegation in its participation in the diplomatic
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conference on the adoption of the treaty. In June 1971, during the discussions in Congress
regarding the proposed amendment of the Copyright Act, Bruce Ladd stated, “[P]assage of the
proposed legislation would greatly enhance this Government’s posture with respect to its
continuing efforts to secure international protection for American sound recordings. . . . Most of
the developed countries, including many in Western Europe and Japan, have provisions, which
deal with this question in one way or another.”116
Another reason for the record industry to seek legitimate protection of sound recordings
was the substantial investment in the production and promotion of sound recordings. Copyright
protection for sound recordings would preserve employment opportunities for performers and
encourage their future contributions to the intellectual creation of sound recordings. Pirates, in
contrast, would not compensate authors, songwriters, or performers for their creative work;
unrestricted piracy thus would greatly discourage such employees from investing any time or
talent in creative recording.
The proposed amendment essentially would extend the existing Copyright Act of 1909,
which did not permit a copyright for sound recordings, by granting limited copyright protection
to sound recordings. No ban would be imposed on imitation or simulation of performances;117
however, the limited copyright protection would prevent duplication in a tangible form of the
particular recorded performance.118 The protection afforded by the amendment thus would not
cover any reproduction of the sounds themselves, as in the case of a broadcast of a sound
recording.

Further, the proposed amendment provided protection only for future sound

recordings. It would not have a retroactive effect on sound recordings already in existence.119
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State common law and statutes regulating the unauthorized duplication of already-recorded
performances would continue to apply in present and future litigation.
The unanimous support of all interested parties facilitated the successful transformation
of the proposed amendment into effective legislation. The House Judiciary Committee; the
House itself; the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights; the Copyright Office; the Department of Justice; and the Department of State
unanimously approved the creation of a sound recording copyright for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy.120

Performers, musicians, publishers,

manufacturers, distributors, and dealers of sound recordings also were supportive of the
amendment.
The weak opposition of the pirates themselves consequently was easily overcome. Pirate
companies could only argue that they protected consumers by offering products at affordable
prices and further encouraged normal business competition. However, no state court had ever
sustained the argument that pirates were legitimate competitors.121

B. Scope and Impact of the 1976 Copyright Act

The Sound Recordings Amendment became effective on February 15, 1972.122 Section
5(n) added sound recordings to the list of works eligible for copyright registration.123 The 1976
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Copyright Act later adopted the same protection,124 which remains controlling law. The scope of
protection for sound recordings secured by the 1971 Amendment and adopted by the 1976
Copyright Act is narrower than that given to other works eligible to be copyrighted. The
protection for sound recordings does not include protection against unauthorized broadcasting or
other public performance.125
Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines “sound recordings” as follows:

“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.126

According to this definition, a sound recording encompasses both musical and literary works, for
example, a recitation of a poem or other declamations.
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It is important to distinguish between several terms that are often confused. First, a
sound recording must be differentiated from a phonorecord,127 the material object that embodies
the sound recording. Examples of a phonorecord are a tape or CD. Secondly, a sound recording
must be distinguished from the work that it captures. Although both are fixed in the same
material object, the sound recording consists of the actual musical work, plus the arrangement by
the musical director, the mixing by a recording engineer, the way that a vocalist sings a song or
instrumentalists play the music. The distinction is important because copyright protection is
granted to the whole complex of described elements, not just to the captured work itself.128 For
example, if a composer authorizes a recording company to make a sound recording of his song,
to select the musicians to perform it and the technical staff to make the appropriate arrangement,
the composer retains his copyright on the musical work while the recording company owns the
copyright on the sound recording.
Any claim of ownership of a sound recording, which represents the contributions of
several individuals, is restricted to those individuals who have made original contributions.
Sound recordings, like any other work granted copyright protection, must satisfy two
fundamental prerequisites: originality and fixation.129

The contributions of a sound record

producer, including the selection of musical works, proper arrangement, and mixing of sound,
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generally are considered sufficient to satisfy the originality requirement. In practice, ownership
of a sound recording usually is resolved through a contract between the sound record producer
and the musical performer.

The latter often assigns his rights to the recording company.

Congress, however, has left the matter of ownership to be determined by “the employment
relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.”130 According to the “works for hire
doctrine,” which was adopted from the 1909 Copyright Act, an employer is considered the
author of the work unless there has been an alternative arrangement.131
The protection granted to sound recordings by the Sound Recordings Amendment
nevertheless is limited in comparison to the copyright protection granted to the other seven
categories of works.132 The copyright protection provided for sound recordings is limited to (i)
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protection against duplication only; (ii) no general public performance right, and (iii) no
retroactive effect to cover works fixed prior to February 15, 1972.
First, section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the exclusive rights of reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, publication, performance, and display to the authors of the other seven
categories of works.133 In contrast, the scope of protection for sound recordings only prohibits
duplication; the holder of the rights in a sound recording thus could not assert a claim of
infringement if another individual recorded an imitation of the same work.134 It is important to
differentiate between the rights of a sound record producer and the rights on the underlying
musical work, however.

The composer holds much greater rights than the sound record

producer, and successfully could assert an infringement of his reproduction rights against an
imitator.
Section 115 further limits the reproduction and adaptation rights for a particular class of
musical works – non-dramatic musical works (for example, excluding ballet and opera) –
through the creation of a compulsory license.135 Under this “mechanical license,” once a song
has been publicly distributed, any individual may make a recording of it as long as he pays the
mechanical royalties and the recording does not represent a duplication.136 Reproduction and
distribution of the underlying work, on the other hand, is limited to private, noncommercial
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purposes.137 For example, background music (muzak) would not fall within the exception of
section 115. Thus, under the compulsory license provision, explicit permission to record is not
necessary because the royalties benefit the copyright owner. Popular songs consistently are
covered by the limitation on the reproduction right imposed by section 115.
Secondly, another fundamental limitation on the sound record producers’ rights is the
lack of a general performance right. As previously described, broadcasters traditionally have
been opposed to the grant of copyright protection for sound recordings because such a copyright
would interfere with their economic interests. If an owner of a copyright in a sound recording
were granted a performance right, the broadcaster would have to pay royalties not only to the
owner of the underlying musical work, but also to the performers and the sound record producer.
Such a scheme would also greatly complicate the allocation of royalties. Legal scholars indeed
have viewed the limited protection afforded by the 1971 Amendment as an essential political
compromise that permitted the grant of a copyright protection for sound recordings.138
Section 114(a) explicitly states, “The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106,
and do not include any right of performance under section 106(4).”139 Essentially, when a radio
station broadcasts a sound recording of a song, the sound record producer may not claim an
infringement of his rights because the copyright for sound recordings does not include a
performance right. Any royalties would belong to the copyright owner of the musical work.
In 1995, Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act by granting a limited performance
right in sound recordings.140 The development of digital technologies had threatened to replace
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the conventional sound recording industry. Because digital technologies could deliver flawless
transmissions to consumers, recording companies feared that consumers would subscribe to a
digital audio service rather than purchase tapes and CDs. The concerns revived support for a
performance right and ultimately resulted in an amendment of section 106. A newly added
subsection (6) grants copyright owners the exclusive right “in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”141 A revised
section 114(d) further regulates digital transmissions; the provision later was modified by the
adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.142
Thirdly, the scope of protection for sound recordings is restricted to recordings made
after the effective date of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 – February 15, 1972.
Section 301(c) provides:

With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or
limited by this title until February 15, 2067.143

Federal copyright law thus excludes copyright protection for sound recordings fixed prior
to February 15, 1972. Such sound recordings will continue to enjoy common law copyright
protection until February 2067. Moreover, section 301 mandates federal preemption of state
laws regulating sound recordings fixed after the effective date if the state law right is “equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights” granted by federal copyright law.144 State law consequently will
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continue to apply to sound recordings fixed after the effective date if the state law provides
different protection than the federal statute.

38

IV. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUND RECORDING
PIRACY LITIGATION

From its inception, developments in copyright law have occurred in response to
significant changes in technology. Recent advances in digital technologies have threatened the
traditional pre-recorded music market. Such technologies make it possible for consumers to
obtain high quality transmissions of any musical work conveniently, without purchasing the
legitimate tape or CD. Additionally, consumers with modern home audio equipment can easily
download digital transmissions to a home recording format. These recordings can then be
replayed or resold.
As a result, the recording industry’s concerns that consumers will subscribe to digital
audio services rather than purchasing copies of sound recordings are justifiable. The concern is
that consumers will increasingly resort to home audio recording as an alternative to purchasing
sound recordings through legitimate channels. Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA) in 1995 in an attempt to relieve these concerns.145 The DPRA
supplemented the 1976 Copyright Act by granting an exclusive digital performance right in
sound recordings;146 simultaneously introducing several exemptions to the digital performance
right by imposing a complex licensing scheme.147 This Act was created because new digital
technologies, such as digital transmissions over the Internet, were not protected under the preexisting law. The Act stroke a balance between the consumer and the owner of the copyright by
allowing a method of compensation to the owner. The Act mandates that online service providers
145
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and some Web site owners pay digital performance license fees to the record companies for
making sound recordings available.
Section IV of this paper will examine some of the more recent online digital forms of
sound recording piracy and the resulting litigation.

Peer-to-peer file sharing particularly

constitutes one of the most popular manifestations of recording piracy today. Before reviewing
peer-to-peer file sharing, however, the paper will examine a similar activity in the context of
home video recording, so as to show that courts generally have treated modern technology and
“personal reproduction” differently in the separate contexts of video and sound recordings.

A. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

Uses of copyrighted materials that qualify as de minimis are presumed to be “fair use”
under United States copyright law.148 Nevertheless, a fair use finding is not limited to the de
minimis doctrine. In the famous “Betamax” case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,149 the motion picture studios’ third party liability claims collapsed because the
conduct of the consumers who used the defendants’ recording equipment was primarily noninfringing.
The defendants, Sony Corporation and its retailers, manufactured and sold home video
tape recorders (VTRs).150 The plaintiffs, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions,
owned the copyrights on television programs that were broadcast on public airwaves.151 The
plaintiffs contended that the defendants were liable for copyright infringement allegedly
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committed by consumers who used the defendants’ VTR equipment to record the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works, in violation of the Copyright Act.152 The plaintiffs sought money damages,
an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacture and marketing of
the VTRs.153 The District Court for the Central District of California denied all relief, holding
that noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair
use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement;154 indeed, the
defendants could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if home use of a VTR
qualified as an infringing use.155 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding the
defendants liable for contributory infringement.156
The Supreme Court of the United States, on the other hand, concluded that the defendants
had demonstrated a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who
licensed their works for broadcast on television would permit home recordings of such
broadcasts for private viewing.157

Moreover, the plaintiffs had failed to prove that time-

shifting158 would cause nonminimal harm to the potential market for, and value of, their
copyrighted works.159 The defendants’ VTR equipment therefore was capable of substantial
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non-infringing uses for the purpose of time shifting; sale of the recorders to the general public
thereby did not constitute copyright infringement.160

B. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.

In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sony, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.,161 the Ninth Circuit held that peer-to-peer file sharing of sound recordings over the Internet
for the purpose of space-shifting represented a copyright infringement.

The plaintiffs,

corporations engaged in the commercial recording, distribution, and sale of copyrighted music
and sound recordings, brought a copyright infringement action, alleging that the defendant was a
contributory and vicarious copyright infringer.162
Through a peer-to-peer file sharing process, the defendant Napster facilitated the
transmission and storage of audio recordings, MP3 files,163 on the Internet.164

Napster
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consequently enabled users to (i) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard
drives accessible for duplication by other Napster users, (ii) search for MP3 music files stored on
other users’ computers, and (iii) transfer exact copies of the contents of MP3 files from one
computer to another via the Internet.165 Napster's MusicShare software, available free of charge
from Napster’s Internet site, its network servers, and its server-side software, permitted such
transmission.166 In contrast to many websites, for example, Yahoo, which function more like
broadcasting stations, Napster’s software also enabled users to interact with each other. Napster
further provided technical support for the indexing and searching of MP3 files, as well as for its
other functions, including a “chat room,” where users could meet to discuss music, and a
directory where participating artists could provide information about their music.167
In order to copy MP3 files through the Napster system, a user first accessed Napster’s
Internet site and downloaded the MusicShare software to his individual computer.168 Once the
software had been installed, the user could access the Napster system. A first-time user was
required to register with the Napster system by creating a user name and password.169 If a
registered user wanted to list files stored in his computer’s hard drive on Napster for other users
to access, he created a “user library” directory on his computer’s hard drive.170 The user then
saved his MP3 files in the library directory, using self-designated file names.171 Next, he logged
into the Napster system using his user name and password.172 His MusicShare software then
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searched his user library and verified that the available files had been properly formatted.173 If
the files were in the correct MP3 format, the names of the MP3 files were uploaded from the
user’s computer to the Napster servers.174 The content of the MP3 files remained stored in the
user’s computer.175
Once uploaded to the Napster servers, the user’s MP3 file names were stored in a serverside “library” under the user’s name and became part of a “collective directory” of files available
for transfer while the user remained logged onto the Napster system.176 The collective directory
was fluid; it tracked users connected in real time, displaying only file names that were
immediately accessible.177
Napster allowed a user to locate other users’ MP3 files in two ways: (i) through Napster’s
search function and (ii) through its “hotlist” function.178 In order to search the files available
from Napster users currently connected to the network servers, the individual user accessed a
form in the MusicShare software stored in his computer and entered either the name of a song or
an artist as the object of the search.179 The user then transmitted the form to a Napster server,
which immediately compared the requested song or artist name to the MP3 file names listed in
the server’s search index.180 Napster’s server compiled a list of all MP3 file names pulled from
the search index which included the same search terms entered on the search form and
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transmitted the list to the searching user.181 The Napster server did not search the contents of any
MP3 file; rather, the search was limited to a text search of the file names.182 Those file names
could contain typographical errors or otherwise inaccurate descriptions of the content of the files
because they had been designated by individual users.183
In order to use the “hotlist” function, the user created a list of other users’ names from
whom he had obtained MP3 files in the past.184 As long as the user was logged onto Napster’s
servers, the system alerted him if any user on his list also was logged onto the system.185 If so,
the user could access all MP3 file names in a particular hotlisted user’s library and request a file
in the library by selecting the file name.186 Notably, however, the contents of users’ MP3 files
were stored in the users’ computers, not on the Napster system.187 Consequently, in order to
transfer a copy of the contents of a requested “hotlisted” MP3 file, the Napster server software
had to obtain the Internet addresses of both the requesting user and “host user.”188 The Napster
servers then communicated the host user’s Internet address to the requesting user.189 The
requesting user’s computer used this information to establish a connection with the host user and
download a copy of the contents of the MP3 file from the host user’s computer to the requested
user’s computer over the Internet – “peer-to-peer.”190 Once downloaded, the user could replay
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the MP3 file directly from his own computer or transfer the contents onto an audio CD.191 The
technical configuration of Napster is described in details to facilitate the understanding of the
mechanical process of transmissions as opposed to their content.
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs.192 On appeal, the
defendant did not contest the District Court’s finding that its users were engaged in wholesale
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works;193 it instead raised the issue of fair use.194
The Ninth Circuit found no error in the District Court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs could
successfully establish (i) that the defendant’s users could not assert a fair use defense, (ii) the
defendant’s liability for contributory copyright infringement, and (iii) the defendant’s liability for
vicarious copyright infringement.
Napster tried to introduce the Sony doctrine by asserting the affirmative defenses of fair
use and substantial non-infringing use through (i) space shifting, (ii) advertisement for new
bands, (iii) sampling, and (iv) sending of voice messages.195 According to Napster, if time
shifting could constitute a fair use, then space shifting (access to MP3 files located on one’s
personal computer from another computer at a different location) also should represent a fair
use.196

Because Napster had been configured to facilitate only the transfer of MP3 files,

however, it was difficult to prove other substantial non-infringing uses, and the Ninth Circuit
ultimately refused to find substantial non-infringing use.197 Without a finding of fair use,
Napster could not avoid liability for contributory copyright infringement.
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Essentially, the key distinction between the Sony and Napster cases that prevented the
application of Sony doctrine in Napster is that Napster had continuing control of the technology.
Once a VTR had been sold, Sony lost control over its use.

Napster, on the other hand,

maintained and supervised an integrated system that users had to access in order to upload or
download files.

Courts distinguish the protection that the Sony doctrine affords to the

manufacture and sale of a device from scenarios where a defendant continues to exercise control
over the device’s use. Given Napster’s ongoing control over its service, as opposed to the mere
manufacture and sale in Sony, the more widespread use such as space shifting did not preclude a
finding of copyright infringement.
The Ninth Circuit also held that Napster’s other asserted non-infringing uses were
insufficient to support a finding of fair use.198

Napster’s primary role in facilitating the

unauthorized duplication and distribution of established artists’ songs rendered Sony
inapplicable.
Since Napster numerous peer-to-peer services have emerged, including Aimster, KaZaA
and Grokster (using the Fast Track network), and Morpheus (using the Gnutella network).199 It
has proven more difficult though to regulate them200 because of their different network
architecture, which does not require a centralized server to process search requests and
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downloads, such that each user’s computer acts as a search engine.201 Nonetheless, such peer-topeer systems have been targeted in anti-piracy campaigns, including legal action initiated by the
Recording Industry association of America (RIAA).202

C. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.

Similarly to Napster, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.203 the court held that
defendant's My.MP3.com service infringes plaintiffs' copyrights in various sound recordings.
The plaintiff record companies sued the defendant MP3.com for copyright infringement, alleging
that the defendant had copied the plaintiffs’ recordings onto its computer servers and replayed
the recordings for its subscribers. Defendant claimed in advertisements that this service
permitted users to store and listen to their CDs from any location at which they could access the
Internet. To operate this service, defendant purchased a large number of CD's containing
plaintiffs' sound recordings, converted them to MP3 files, and stored these MP3 files on its
servers.204 A user wishing to access any of the songs contained in these files was first required
either to demonstrate to defendant that it owned a CD containing the song in question (by
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inserting the CD into its computer), or to purchase the CD from a designated online vendor.205
Once the user satisfied this requirement, he was permitted for free to access the MP3 file resident
on defendant's server, which MP3 file had been created from plaintiffs' CDs.
The defendant argued that it basically provided storage service for the subscribers’
CDs;206 however, the court held that defendant's act of converting plaintiffs' CDs into MP3 files,
and providing access to these files to users in the manner outlined above, infringed plaintiffs'
copyrights in these sound recordings.207
The court rejected defendant's argument that this was a fair use of plaintiffs' sound
recordings.208

In reaching this conclusion, the court held that: (i) defendant's use was

commercial (defendant intended to sell advertising on its site once it had adequate user traffic)209
and not transformative (the defendant merely re-transmitted the unauthorized copies in a
different medium)210, (ii) the protected work was close to the core of those intended to receive
copyright protection211, (iii) defendant had copied virtually all of plaintiffs' works212, and (iv) by
its actions, adversely impacted plaintiffs' ability to license their works in this fashion.213 All four
of the factors traditionally used to assess fair-use defenses thus disfavored MP3.com.
The defendant contended that its activities actually enhanced the plaintiffs’ sales because
subscribers could not gain access to the recordings on MP3.com servers without purchasing the
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commercial CD versions, the court found the argument unpersuasive.214 The court emphasized
that the defendant could not interfere with the plaintiffs’ future market by alleging positive
influence on plaintiffs’ past sales.215 Finally, in response to the defendant’s assertion that it
provided a worthwhile service to consumers that otherwise would be dominated by pirates, the
court said that copyright “is not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience but,
rather, to protect the copyrightholders’ property interests.”216

Judge Rakoff found that

MP3.com's behavior had constituted "willful" copyright infringement and ordered the defendant
to pay UMG $25,000 per copied CD. Total damages under this formula thus exceeded $250
million.

The ruling acted as a deterrent to other firms considering innovative ways of

distributing digital music.217

D. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.

RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.218 involved another manifestation of Internet sound
recording piracy. More significantly, the case demonstrated the means by which innovations in
technology may offer alternative methods of protection to copyright owners. The plaintiff,
RealNetworks, developed and marketed software products designed to enable copyright owners
to send the content of their audio, video, and other multimedia works to users over the
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Internet.219

The products, specifically the “RealProducer,” the “RealServer,” and the

“RealPlayer,” facilitated the distribution and retrieval of digital audio and video content over the
Internet through the streaming process.220
The concept of “streaming” is central in RealNetworks. Streaming is a self-deleting
process by which audio and video passes over a computer network without leaving any physical
file which can be recorded or otherwise used in violation of copyright restrictions unless the
content owner has authorized the consumer to download the file.221 In short, streaming is one of
the innovative technologies designed to prevent unauthorized audio and video duplication since
no trace of the clip remains on the consumer’s computer.
Streaming is different from “downloading,” a process by which a complete copy of an
audio or video work is delivered to and stored on a consumer's computer.222

Because a

downloaded copy of a digital audio or video file is essentially indistinguishable from the
original, once a consumer has downloaded a file, he or she can easily create additional copies of
the file for redistribution to third parties.223 A consumer who downloads a digital file in order to
create and redistribute copies creates a tenuous market situation, as sales of the counterfeit
product could negatively impact sales of the original work.224 To guard against the unauthorized
duplication and redistribution of their works, many copyright owners therefore distribute their
works through streaming rather than allowing their intellectual property to be downloaded.225 A
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majority of Internet servers delivering music or video through the streaming process make use of
the RealNetworks format.226
For example, using RealProducer, a content owner encodes audio or video content into
digital RealNetwork format, called “RealAudio” or “RealVideo” files (collectively “RealMedia”
files).227 The content owner then distributes the RealMedia files to consumers by means of either
a RealServer or an ordinary web server.228 The RealServer, a software program installed in a
content owner's computer, holds RealMedia files and "serves" them to consumers through
streaming.229 Finally, the end-user may download content from an ordinary web server using an
Internet browser such as Netscape's Navigator or Microsoft's Internet Explorer in conjunction
with a RealPlayer plugin.230

RealPlayer is a software program installed on an end-user's

computer, which can work in conjunction with or independently from the user’s browser to
access and play a streaming RealMedia file sent from a RealServer.231
RealNetworks products thus enable content owners to make their audio and video works
available to consumers. Simultaneously, RealNetworks utilizes a number of security measures to
protect the content against unauthorized access or duplication.232
The first security measure, the "Secret Handshake," an authentication sequence known
only to RealServers and RealPlayers, ensures that media files hosted by a RealServer will only
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be sent to a RealPlayer.233 Unless the authentication sequence occurs, a RealServer will not
stream the requested content.234
Secondly, the "Copy Switch" is a data in all RealMedia files that contains the content
owner's preference regarding whether or not the streamed content may be copied by end-users.235
RealPlayers are designed to read this Copy Switch and obey the content owner's wishes.236 If a
content owner activates the Copy Switch in a particular RealMedia file, an end-user may use the
RealPlayer to save a copy of the streamed RealMedia file to the user's computer.237 If a content
owner does not activate the Copy Switch in a particular RealMedia file, the RealPlayer will not
allow an end-user to make a copy of that file.238 The file will simply "evaporate" as it is
streamed.239 Therefore, through the use of the Secret Handshake and the Copy Switch, owners
of audio and video content may selectively prevent unauthorized duplication.240
By making content available on their websites, copyright owners are better able to attract
consumers to their sites and expose them to advertisements.241 The success of RealNetworks,
therefore, depends on preventing users from circumventing the RealNetworks security measures.
If consumers could create unauthorized copies of the audio or video content, many copyright
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owners would not make their content available to end-users.242 Thus, a copyright owner could
lose the traffic generated by his or her content without RealNetworks' security measures.243
RealNetworks' technology enables end-users to listen to, but not record, music that is on sale
either at a website or in retail stores.244 Other digital technology enables users to listen to content
on a "pay-per-play" basis that requires an end-user to pay each time he or she listens to the
content.245

Without the security measures afforded by RealNetworks, these methods of

distribution could not succeed. End-users could make and redistribute digital copies of any
content available on the Internet, undermining the market for the original copyrighted work.246
Indeed, RealNetworks' success as a company is due in significant part to the fact that it has
offered copyright owners a successful means of protecting against unauthorized duplication and
distribution of their digital works.247
The defendant, Streambox, provided software products for processing and recording
audio and video content, including but not limited to content that was streamed over the
Internet.248 Streambox also maintained a searchable database of Internet web addresses of
various audio and video offerings on the Internet.249 The Streambox products at issue were the
“Streambox VCR,” the “Ripper,” and the “Ferret.”250
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The Streambox VCR enabled end-users not only to access RealMedia files streamed over
the Internet, but also to download them.251 While Streambox VCR also allowed users to copy
RealMedia files that had been made freely available for downloading from ordinary web servers,
the more controversial function of the VCR allowed users to copy and access RealMedia files
located on RealServers.252 The Streambox VCR mimicked a RealPlayer and circumvented the
authentication procedure, or Secret Handshake, that a RealServer required before it would stream
content.253 In other words, the Streambox VCR was able to convince the RealServer into
thinking that the VCR was, in fact, a RealPlayer.254 Thus, the RealServer began streaming
content, but unlike the RealPlayer, the VCR ignored the Copy Switch that told a RealPlayer
whether an end-user was allowed to make a copy of (i.e., download) the RealMedia file as it was
being streamed.255 The VCR thus allowed the end-user to download RealMedia files even if the
content owner had used the Copy Switch to prohibit end-users from downloading the files.256
The Streambox VCR circumvented the Secret Handshake and interacted with a RealServer so as
to allow an end-user to access and make copies of content that a copyright holder had placed on a
RealServer in order to secure it against unauthorized copying.257
Streambox VCR was comparable to a “black box” which descrambled cable or satellite
broadcasts so that viewers could watch paid programming for free.258 Like the cable and satellite
companies that scrambled their video signals to control access to their programs, RealNetworks
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had employed technological measures to ensure that only users of the RealPlayer could access
RealMedia content placed on a RealServer.259 RealNetworks had gone one step further than the
cable and satellite companies, not only controlling access, but also allowing copyright owners to
specify whether or not their works could be copied by end-users, even if access had been
permitted.260 The Streambox VCR circumvented both the access control and copy protection
measures.261
The Streambox VCR should be distinguished from a third-party product sold by
RealNetworks called GetRight.262 GetRight enabled end-users to download RealAudio files that
had been placed on a web server, but not RealAudio files that had been placed on a
RealServer.263 A copyright owner that placed a RealMedia file onto a web server instead of a
RealServer did not make use of the protections offered by the RealNetworks security system.264
Thus, when GetRight was used to obtain such a file, it need not and did not circumvent
RealNetworks' access control and copyright protection measures.265 GetRight could not access
materials available from a RealServer because it could not perform the requisite Secret
Handshake.266 Unlike GetRight, the Streambox VCR circumvented the Secret Handshake and
enabled users to make digital copies of content that the copyright owner had indicated that
should not be copied.267
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Once an unauthorized, digital copy of a RealMedia file was created it could be
redistributed to others at the touch of a button.268 Thus the Streambox VCR posed a threat to
RealNetworks' relationships with existing and potential customers who wished to secure their
content for transmission over the Internet and must decide whether to purchase and use
RealNetworks' technology.269 If the Streambox VCR remained available, these customers likely
would have opted not to utilize RealNetworks' technology, believing that it would not protect
their content against unauthorized copying.270
The plaintiff RealNetworks basically claimed that the defendant Streambox had violated
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)271, by distributing and marketing certain
products that allegedly infringed upon a copyright held by plaintiff and sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent defendant's continued manufacture, distribution, and sale of the products.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), passed by Congress in 1998 in response to
concerns that existing copyright law was not up to the task of protecting intellectual property in a
digital world, has anti-circumvention provisions that assist copyright owners who use technology
to protect their works from copying. The law, aimed at restraining Internet piracy, made it
illegal to break the digital locks protecting copyrighted material.
Section 1201(a)(1)(A) provides that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work . . . .”272 Section 1201(a)(2) mandates:
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No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that –
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.273

The DMCA defines the term “to circumvent a technological measure” as the ability “to
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner.”274 Under the statute, a technological measure moreover “effectively controls access to a
work if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access
to the work.”275
Under the three-part test adopted by the RealNetworks court, a defendant violated the
DMCA if the defendant’s activity (i) primarily had been designed to serve a circumvention
function, (ii) had only limited commercially significant purposes beyond the circumvention, or
273
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(iii) had been marketed as a means of circumvention.276 The court applied the test in the
disjunctive; thereby, satisfaction of any one of the three bases was sufficient to impose liability
on a defendant.277
The court found that Streambox VCR sufficiently fulfilled at least the first two bases.
First, at least one primary function of the Streambox VCR had been to circumvent the access
control and copy protection measures that RealNetworks afforded to copyright owners.278
Secondly, the function that permitted circumvention had no commercially significant purpose
other than to enable users to access and record protected content.279
The defendant Streambox argued that the VCR allowed consumers to make “fair use”
copies of RealMedia files.280 However, the court concluded that Streambox was not entitled to
the same “fair use” protection the U.S. Supreme Court had afforded video cassette recorders used
for “time shifting” in Sony.281 In contrast to the situation in Sony, where the court had held that a
substantial number of copyright holders would not object to having their works time-shifted,
copyright owners actively sought to prevent the duplication enabled by the Streambox VCR by
placing their content on RealServers and choosing to turn off the Copy Switch.282
Moreover, the leading treatise on copyright law suggested that, after the enactment of the
DMCA:
[T]hose who manufacture equipment and products generally can no longer gauge
their conduct as permitted or forbidden by reference to the Sony doctrine. For a
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given piece of machinery might qualify as a staple item of commerce, with a
substantial noninfringing use, and hence be immune from attack under Sony's
construction of the Copyright Act – but nonetheless still be subject to suppression
under Section 1201. . . . [E]quipment manufacturers in the twenty-first century
will need to vet their products for compliance with Section 1201 in order to avoid
a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copyright claim.”283

RealNetworks demonstrated that technology itself may not always offer an effective
measure of protection; the law particularly may play an important role when an individual
attempts to circumvent technological protections.284
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V. REMEDIES UNDER UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW AGAINST SOUND
RECORDING PIRACY

Federal law provides a broad range of remedies for a successful plaintiff in a copyright
infringement action, such as sound recording piracy. Available remedies include non-monetary
relief (preliminary and permanent injunctions, impoundment, and disposition of infringing
works), and monetary relief (actual damages, profits and statutory or “in lieu” damages). In
addition to the remedies available against sound recording piracy in a civil action, the
government may also subject an infringer to criminal penalties.

A. Non-Monetary Relief

Under § 502(a) of the Copyright Act, a district court may grant temporary and final
injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain an infringement
of a copyright.”285 Injunctive relief is subject to the discretion of the court. The general
principles governing this equitable remedy are: (i) a showing of irreparable harm, (ii) weighing
the threatened injury to the plaintiff against the harm an injunction might inflict on the defendant,
and (iii) in the case of preliminary relief, the reasonable likelihood of the plaintiff’s success.286
In granting injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases, courts frequently presume the
presence of irreparable harm.287
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A majority of the Courts of Appeals moreover employs a standard four-part preliminary
injunction test, which considers the following factors:
i. the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if an injunction
is not granted;
ii. the balance between the harm to the plaintiff and the injury that granting the
injunction would inflict on the defendant;
iii. the probability that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits; and
iv. promotion of the public interest.288

Once a district court finds copyright infringement, the court does not retain broad
discretion to deny injunctive relief on general public interest grounds; however, the court does
have broad discretion to balance the harm.289 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,290 the United States
Supreme Court noted the propriety of public interest consideration in granting injunctive relief,
especially where serious questions of fair use arise. The Court stated:

[W]hile in the “vast majority of cases, [an injunctive] remedy is justified because
most infringements are simple piracy,” such cases are “worlds apart from many of
those raising reasonable contentions of fair use” where “there may be a strong
public interest in the publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright
owner’s interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages for
whatever infringement is found.”291
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If a plaintiff in an infringement action ultimately prevails, he then may be entitled to a
permanent injunction.292 A permanent injunction may prohibit future infringements of existing
works already registered in the Copyright Office.
Impoundment and disposition are two other non-monetary forms of equitable remedies
available to a plaintiff under the Copyright Act. A court may order, at any time while an action
is pending, “the impounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies or
phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by
means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.”293
In addition, section 503(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that a court may order
“the destruction or other reasonable disposition” of both the infringing articles and the equipment
used to produce them.294 By “other reasonable disposition,” the provision contemplates sale to
the public, delivery to the plaintiff, or other disposition that would avoid needless waste and best
serve the ends of justice.295 For example, some courts have suggested the charitable donation of
the infringing articles for distribution to poor children.296
available remedy, courts generally have not favored it.297
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Finally, while destruction is an

B. Damages

Section 504 of the Copyright Act represents the cornerstone of the remedies section of
the act, and it deals with the recovery of actual damages, profits, and statutory damages. The
section provides:

The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages . . .298

Courts have defined actual damages as “the extent to which the market value of a
copyrighted work has been injured or destroyed by an infringement.”299 Many courts support the
view that a plaintiff’s actual damages may include the reasonable license fee on which a willing
buyer and seller would have agreed for the use taken by the infringer. Actual damages may also
include profits lost by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement, as well as any non-duplicative
profits of the infringer.300
On the other hand, a plaintiff may only recover profits that are not taken into account
when computing actual damages. Section 504(b) recognizes the different purposes served by
awards of damages and profits. Damages compensate a copyright owner for losses from the
infringement, while profits prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.
When a defendant’s profits are comparable to the damages suffered by a copyright owner, it is

298

17 U.S.C. § 504(b).

299

Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512 (1985).

300

See Sheldon W. Halpern et al., supra note 287 at 162-163.

64

not appropriate to award damages and profits cumulatively.301 However, when a copyright
owner has suffered damages that are not reflected in the infringer’s profits, or profits attributable
to the copyrighted work have not been used as a measure of damages, the award of both damages
and profits is afforded.302
In either scenario, the defendant carries the burden of proof. In order to establish profits,
the plaintiff must only prove the infringer’s gross revenue; the defendant has to prove deductible
expenses and any profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.303 In proving an
infringer’s gross revenues, the plaintiff’s counsel must be careful to show that the figures offered
in evidence are derived solely from the sale of the infringing product. The questions of the
nature and amount of appropriate deductions, as well as the allocation of profits to infringing and
non-infringing activity, are difficult and complex.
Moreover, in order to satisfy his burden of proof, an infringer does not necessarily have
to proffer exact proof; the court ultimately will make such apportionment as it deems proper. In
Cream Records, Inc. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,304 the court stated:

[W]here it is clear that . . . not all of the profits are attributable to the infringing
material, the copyright owner is not entitled to recover all of those profits merely
because the infringer fails to establish with certainty the portion attributable to the
non-infringing elements.305
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It is not always easy to prove actual damages, even when infringement is clearly
established. The Copyright Act consequently provides an alternative monetary remedy, statutory
damages, in lieu of proven actual damages. Under § 504(c)(1), a plaintiff may elect to recover
statutory damages at any time during the trial before the court has rendered a final judgment.306
The allowance of statutory damages is unique to copyright law.307 Statutory damages cannot be
recovered for patent, trademark, or trade secret infringement.308

However, this alternative

monetary relief is not available for infringement, which commenced after the first publication of
a work and prior to the effective date of its registration “unless such registration is made within
three months after the first publication of the work.”309 Statutory damages also cannot be
awarded for “any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the
effective date of its registration.”310
The Copyright Act further establishes general rates applicable to awards of statutory
damages. Generally, when a plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages for infringement with
respect to any one work, the recoverable range is between $750 and $30,000.311 The court has
discretion to award any amount within that range. Where multiple acts of infringement are
involved on more than one separate and independent work312, statutory damages for each work
must be awarded. Each work infringed may form the basis of only one award, regardless of the
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number of separate infringements on that work.313 For example, if a defendant has infringed
three copyrighted works, the copyright owner may be awarded statutory damages anywhere
between the range of $2,250 and $90,000. Under the Copyright Act, two or more joint tortfeasors
who have infringed a copyrighted work are jointly and severally liable for an amount within the
$750-$350,000 range.314 However, when two or more defendants in the same action have
committed separate infringements, for which the defendants are not jointly liable, separate
awards of statutory damages are appropriate.315
In certain exceptional cases, section 504(c)(2) grants courts the discretion to award
statutory damages above the maximum amount in cases of willful infringement and below the
minimum amount where an infringer is innocent.316 The burden of proving willfulness rests on
the copyright owner, while the burden of proving innocence rests on the infringer. Courts may
raise the maximum amount of statutory damages from $30,000 to $150,000, and reduce the
minimum amount from $750 to $250.317
Within the meaning of § 504(c)(2), “willful” means “with knowledge that the defendant’s
conduct constitutes copyright infringement.”318 Under the statutory scheme, willfulness has a
specialized meaning. It requires knowledge that the act constitutes infringement, or action in
reckless disregard of the copyright owner’s rights: 319
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Willfulness, under [the] statutory scheme, has a rather specialized meaning. . .“In
other contexts [‘willfulness’] might simply mean an intent to copy, without
necessarily an intent to infringe. It seems clear that as here used, ‘willfully’
means with knowledge that the defendant’s conduct constitutes copyright
infringement. Otherwise, there would be no point in providing specially for the
reduction of minimum awards in the case of innocent infringement, because any
infringement that was nonwillful would necessarily be innocent. This seems to
mean, then, that one who has been notified that his conduct constitutes copyright
infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith believes the contrary, is not
‘willful’ for these purposes.”320

In cases where an infringer is innocent and proves that he “was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”321 In
certain special circumstances, where an infringer had reasonable belief that the act of
infringement was a fair use and the infringer is an employee or agent of a non-profit educational
institution, library, or archive, or where the infringement was of a performance transmitted by a
public broadcasting entity, the court is precluded from awarding any statutory damages.322
Even though the Copyright Act refers to the court’s discretion in determining the amount
of statutory damages, a conflict developed among the circuit courts as to the right of the parties
in an infringement action to a jury trial with respect to the amount of statutory damages. In
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1998, the United States Supreme Court resolved the conflict in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc.,323 stating, “[T]he Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all
issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act,
including the amount itself.”324
Costs and attorney’s fees may be recovered in a suit for copyright infringement at the
court’s discretion.325 Recovery of full costs is afforded by or against any party (other than the
United States or an officer thereof) and reasonable attorney’s fees may be awarded to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.326 The copyright must be registered in order for the
prevailing plaintiff to be able to recover attorney’s fees (but not costs), the same way registration
is a requisite for recovery of statutory damages.327
The prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant, is the party who was successful at the
conclusion of all proceedings, not just the trial on the merits.328 There has been a disagreement
among the circuit courts as to whether the standard for determining a prevailing plaintiff and a
prevailing defendant should be the same. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court resolved the
disagreement in Fogetry v. Fantasy, Inc.329 The Supreme Court refused to follow lower court
precedent supporting favored treatment for plaintiffs on the issue of attorney’s fees and held that
Congress intended no such disparity between plaintiffs and defendants when it permitted the
court award of reasonable fees to the prevailing party. The Court explained:
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Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the
boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end,
defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses
should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement . . . [A] successful
defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the
Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement
claim by the holder of a copyright.
....
Thus we reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the Courts
of Appeals, and petitioner’s claim that § 505 enacted the British Rule for
automatic recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s fees are to be
awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion.330

The exact standards are not very clear, but usually courts consider such factors as
“frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence . . . so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the
Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded
manner.”331 In determining the amount of “reasonable” attorney’s fees, courts may consider
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counsel’s skill and reputation, the actual fee charged, the amount of work expended, the result
achieved at trial, and the monetary recovery allowed.332

C. Criminal Penalties

In addition to the remedies available to a copyright owner in a civil action, § 506(a) of the
Copyright Act makes it a criminal offense to infringe a copyright “willfully and for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”333 Section 2319 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, entitled “Criminal Infringement of a Copyright,” provides that in such cases the infringer
may be subject to felony or misdemeanor punishment.334 Felony liability usually arises when,
during any 180-day period, an infringer reproduces or distributes at least ten copies or
phonorecords of one or more copyrighted works having a retail value of more than $2,500
without the authorization of the copyright owner.335 For such a violation, the maximum penalty
is imprisonment for not more than 5 years for first-time offenders and 10 years for recidivists,
and/or a fine up to $250,000 for individuals336 and up to $500,000 for organizations.337 When
the requisite number of copies is not made within that period of time, or the infringing acts are
different from reproduction or distribution, courts would impose misdemeanor liability.338
Congress amended § 506 of the Copyright Act in 1997 to fill a gap in the criminal
copyright provisions by making it clear that willful infringement is a crime even when profit
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motives are missing.339 The penalties apply, among other things, to infringements by “electronic
means.”340 Section 506(a)(1), which covers willful infringement for “purposes of commercial
advantage or financial gain,”341 applies only to commercial infringers who make ten or more
copies in any given six-month period.342 Under § 506(a)(2), infringers can be prosecuted even
when they have made a single copy of the requisite value and with no commercial element
necessarily present.343
The remaining subsections of § 506 of the Copyright Act provide additional criminal
penalties.

Section 506(b) provides for mandatory forfeiture and disposition (usually by

destruction) of the infringing copies or phonorecords and the equipment used in the
infringement.344 Subsections (c), (d), and (e) criminalize the fraudulent use of copyright notice,
the fraudulent removal of such notice, and the false representation of material facts in connection
with the copyright registration.345
Criminal penalties for violations of the new prohibitions contained in Chapter 12 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act346, previously discussed in Chapter IV of this paper, are also
available. The anti-piracy provisions of the DMCA prohibit: (i) the circumvention of
technological protection measures taken by copyright holders to limit access to copyrighted
material347, (ii) the facilitation of such circumvention and of circumvention of technological
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measures that inhibit infringing activities,348 and (iii) the infringement on the integrity of
copyright management information. 349
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VI. CONCLUSION

Copyright law evolution has become increasingly intertwined with the development of
technology. Originating as a response to the invention of the printing press,350 and then in turn,
the phonograms, radio and television, cable and satellite transmissions, videocassette recorders,
compact disks and digital versatile disc (DVD) technology, now, the Internet is affecting the
form and substance of intellectual property rights. Copyright law today is being modified to suit
the online environment of a digital age when copyrighted material can be converted into binary
numbers and transmitted, redistributed, and copied over the Internet in a perfect digital form.
Innovations continue to challenge both Congress and courts. Technological advances have been,
and will continue to be, the driving forces behind the periodic updates in copyright law, as new
inventions render older laws obsolete. Today, the law is challenged not only with confronting
the latest revolutionary advances in technology, but also with anticipating ever more frequent
technological developments.

These developments will continue to reshape the traditional

copyright landscape in the future.
The Internet’s prevalence provides tremendous opportunities for the music business’s
development; at the same time, it presents major challenges. The recording industry increasingly
complains that it has suffered major financial losses because online recording downloading has
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hurt its sales. Even though some scholars recently opposed this theory,351 the harm to artists and
performers remains unclear. There is an increasing tendency among bands to move away from
plastic CDs and to rely more greatly on concerts as a legitimate alternative to exposing their
music. Moreover, some bands find that through concerts they are able to obtain higher financial
remuneration than through the sale of music albums.352
The recording industry has turned to several self-help measures to fight the sound
recording piracy. Immediately after the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) sent “cease and desist” letters to online
service providers, music web sites, and individual consumers, notifying them of infringing
materials or services on their systems and thereby ensuring that these materials were removed or
blocked. Additionally, the recording industry is exploring methods to make sound recordings
available online, while protecting its rights and recovering investments.
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technological tools such as encryption and watermarking353 to provide practical solutions to
sound recording piracy. Distributing of “spoof” files354 of sound recordings onto peer-to-peer
networks, that contain only limited or degraded portions of the recording, and are designed to
discourage piracy by making the illegitimate file services less attractive, is another technique
used by the industry.355 An additional alternative to the unauthorized downloading of music
files, which has already been implemented by some music web sites,356 is charging visitors per
“hit.” Even with nominal charges per sound recording, in the aggregate, the amount could
protect the copyright owners’ economic rights. Certain web sites357 have chosen to still provide
free music to visitors by offsetting their expenses for licenses through selling advertising space.
Meanwhile, organizations such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), and
RIAA continue to facilitate the issuance of music licenses, thereby transforming it into an
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Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music – No More Free Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 JCPS
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industry custom and increasing public awareness of the criminal nature of unauthorized copying
of sound recordings.358
In the past few months, there have been mixed developments in the recording industry’s
battle against illegal file-sharing. A new bill authorizing civil charges in file-sharing cases is
making its way through the Senate,359 and a bill criminalizing copyright violations over peer-topeer networks has been approved by a House Judiciary subcommittee.360

The Justice

Department has established an Intellectual Property Task Force to look at ways to stop violations
and to step up criminal prosecutions of copyright infringers.361 Whatever the solution of the
piracy problem may be, the sound recording industry will have to balance the protection of the
law against the strong public interest that innovation continue. Some recording companies have
realized that and have begun to post paid versions of songs on file-sharing networks simply for
exposure.362 Technology might be an effective tool to prevent copyright infringement, but there
is always an override to the protection measures, and this is when the law is needed. The music
industry has been increasingly discussing363 technical solutions to combat the illegal copying of
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digital material. At the same time, placing the burden of piracy only on technology is simply
seeing just one side of it. Technology can be part of the solution, but it is not the entire solution.
In a recent agreement with computer companies,364 RIAA consequently said that under most
circumstances, it would oppose legislation that would require computers and consumer
electronics devices to be designed to restrict unauthorized copying of audio material.365 The
recording industry seems not to have been a strong supporter of legislation that would mandate
technical solutions to digital piracy.366
The close relationship between the law of copyright and technology is the reason for the
tension underlying the right solution against sound recording piracy – the tension between the
law’s potentially repressive impact and the purpose of copyright to benefit society.367 The
United States Constitution gives Congress the power to promote science and useful arts by
granting to creators for limited times proprietary rights in their creations.368 Two main pillars
underlie this clause: the purpose of copyright to benefit society by promoting dissemination of
arts and science and stimulating innovation, and the purpose to provide economical incentives to

two different technologies, which allow copyright holders to set rules on how people can use a wide range of
products, and the legal policies that govern them could inhibit free expression and innovation.
364
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Gary S. Lutzker, Dat’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 – Merrie Melodies or

Looney Tunes, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 149 (1992).
368

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

78

authors to create. In the words of Professor Ray Patterson, one of the leading experts in
copyright law:

We must take care to guard against two extremes, equally prejudicial: the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time in the service of the
community, may not be deprived of merits, and the award of their labor and
ingenuity; the other that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts retarded.369

Similarly, the right solution in the battle against sound recording piracy lies in striking a
balance between innovations in technology and copyright laws.
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